

Are recent immigrants waves lagging behind?

Hispanics and especially Mexicans are very mobile and segregation in cities is high but falling see Tienda, Marta, and Norma Fuentes (2014) "[Hispanics in metropolitan America: New realities and old debates.](#)" Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 499-520.



## Hispanics in Metropolitan America: New Realities and Old Debates

Marta Tienda<sup>1,2,3</sup> and Norma Fuentes<sup>4</sup>

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
Immigrant Niches (Russell Sage Journal)

Why do we care about Hispanic Identity? Because as Maria Abascal emphasizes (powerpoint) George Borjas and Samuel Huntington argue that a) some Hispanic groups are not assimilating (mainly Mexicans and Central American immigrants...many of them undocumented) and 2) These groups have been targeted by recent efforts to scale back U.S. Asylum and Refugee programs and they have been the target and Secure communities and an whole series of deportation strategies...


[Leah Boustan is now at Princeton she](#) does research on the history of immigration, including Italian and Irish

The passage, implementation and legacy of the [1986 IRCA Book Talk August 1<sup>st</sup> 2019 3-5pm](#)

**Download at Fordham:** Maria Abascal (2018) Tu Casa, Mi Casa: [Naturalization and Belonging among Latino Immigrants](#) Abstract Previous studies reach contradictory conclusions regarding the relationship between residential concentration and naturalization. This paper tackles the impasse by exploring the pathways through which immigrant communities influence individual naturalization. Specifically, this study examines naturalization among Latino immigrants using the 2006 Latino National Survey linked to county data. Multilevel model results indicate that the county concentration of naturalized co-ethnics positively predicts individual naturalization, and this relationship operates through two channels: information dissemination and perceived belonging. Regarding the latter, Latino immigrants who live among naturalized



co-ethnics identify more strongly as “American,” and strength of American identification mediates nearly one-half of the relationship between concentration and naturalization.



## Are My Kids 'Latino Enough'?

By ANTONIA CERREJIDO DEC 23, 2016 ● FAMILY ● IDENTITY

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Latino parents can experience a certain kind of insecurity: Are you doing everything you

# SPOTLIGHT ON HEROINE MARIA HINOJOSA, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER AND HOST OF LATINO USA >




by Abigail Licad

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## Among Americans with Hispanic ancestry, share that identifies as Hispanic or Latino falls across immigrant generations

*% of U.S. adults with Hispanic ancestry who self-identify as \_\_\_\_*



Note: Self-identified Hispanics are those who say they are Hispanic. Self-identified non-Hispanics are those who say they are not Hispanic or Latino but say they have Hispanic ancestry or heritage.

Source: Pew Research Center 2015 National Survey of Latinos (Oct. 21-Nov. 30, 2015) and survey of self-identified non-Hispanics with Hispanic ancestry or heritage only (Nov. 11, 2015-Feb. 7, 2016).

"Hispanic Identity Fades Across Generations as Immigrant Connections Fall Away"

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**Richard Alba** @albamoore1 · 16h

You can read my forthcoming book (in 2020), *The Great Demographic Illusion*, for a analytic synthesis of the evidence. For individuals of Anglo-Hispanic parentage, there nothing substantial to support that concern. Helpful for you might be the Pew Report on Hispanic identity.

**FredR** @Auberon\_Quin · 18h

Replying to @Auberon\_Quin and @albamoore1

In any event I can't speak for Wax but one pertinent concern would be assimilation into a mixed-race American underclass

1 2 19



**Richard Alba** @albamoore1 · 18h

But they are pretty closely tied to education. And the whole stagnation argument was about education. The other aspect to bear in mind is the high rate of family mixing between Anglos and Hispanics, which is not consistent with a failure to integrate.

**FredR** @Auberon\_Quin · 18h

Replying to @albamoore1

Thank you very much for the recommendation. I'll take a look. Tbh, I'm more concerned about income/occupation, but it sounds encouraging

1 2



**Richard Alba** @albamoore1 · 18h

So the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, because a significant percentage of Hispanic-descent Americans no longer call themselves "Hispanics" by the third generation, and they tend to be more educated. But a recent ACE report finds a surge in Hispanic education since 2000.

**FredR** @Auberon\_Quin · 19h

Replying to @albamoore1

I have read that Hispanic immigrant educational/economic achievement, after rising in the 2nd gen. stalls below American mean. Is that true?

# WHO ARE WE?

THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

Author of THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER

Source country	Men, by immigrant generation				Women, by immigrant generation			
	First		Second		First		Second	
	Avg. educ.	Sample size	Avg. educ.	Sample size	Avg. educ.	Sample size	Avg. educ.	Sample size
Mexico	9.5	31,039	12.7	7,671	9.7	28,167	12.9	8,468
Puerto Rico	12.2	2,909	12.7	2,459	12.4	3,643	13.0	2,996
Cuba	13.0	2,062	14.3	821	13.2	2,051	14.6	806
Dominican Republic	11.9	1,658	13.5	363	12.0	2,599	14.1	422
Central America	9.7	8,323	13.4	938	10.3	7,940	13.9	1,054
South America	13.3	5,962	14.4	1,116	13.5	7,068	14.5	1,162
China	14.9	3,149	15.4	886	14.4	3,802	15.5	902
India	16.3	5,200	15.9	576	16.0	4,700	16.0	552
Japan	15.7	560	14.4	659	14.9	1,099	14.7	645
Korea	15.4	1,898	15.0	544	14.6	2,827	15.4	530
Philippines	14.4	3,779	14.4	1,590	14.7	5,970	14.7	1,674
Vietnam	13.1	2,637	14.6	395	12.6	3,031	14.9	397
Haiti	12.8	1,056	14.1	175	12.7	1,246	14.8	235
Jamaica	13.1	1,215	14.1	286	13.5	1,756	14.8	361
Africa	14.4	4,755	14.7	604	13.6	4,238	15.0	637
Canada	15.1	1,725	14.2	3,330	14.9	2,072	14.5	3,481
Europe	14.5	10,147	14.5	12,895	14.5	11,594	14.6	13,351
All countries	12.2	99,966	13.9	38,459	12.4	106,372	14.1	40,812

OPT: Optional Practical Training see Furtado et al. (2019)

## Asylum in the United States

*Asylum is a protection granted to foreign nationals already in the United States or at the border who meet the international law definition of a “refugee.” The United Nations 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol define a refugee as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country, and cannot obtain protection in that country, due to past persecution or a well-founded fear of being persecuted in the future “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Congress incorporated this definition into U.S. immigration law in the Refugee Act of 1980.*

*As a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, and through U.S. immigration law, the United States has legal obligations to provide protection to those who qualify as refugees. The Refugee Act established two paths to obtain refugee status—either from abroad as a resettled refugee or in the United States as an asylum seeker.*

## References

Furtado, Delia, Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, and Huanan Xu. (2019) "OPT Policy Changes and Foreign Born STEM Talent in the US." *Labour Economics*. 101752.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0927537119300788>

- We study the 2008 Optional Practical Training extension for STEM graduates.
- The extension raised student visa arrivers’ relative propensity to major in STEM.
- Engineering was the STEM field benefiting the most from the policy change.
- Students with a terminal master's degree were the most responsive.
- The extension induced double majoring in STEM and transitions to STEM.

Abstract Academia and the public media have emphasized the link between STEM majors and innovation as well as the need for STEM graduates in the U.S. economy. Given the proclivity of international students to major in STEM fields, immigration policy may be used to attract and retain high-skilled STEM workers in the United States. We examine the impacts of a 2008 policy extending the Optional Practical Training (OPT) period for STEM graduates. Using data from the National Survey of College Graduates, we find that, relative to other foreign-born U.S. college graduates, the foreign-born who first came on student visas were 18 percent more likely to have their degrees in STEM fields if they enrolled in their major after the OPT policy change. While part of this increase is likely due to the rather mechanical drop in return migration among STEM graduates following the OPT change, the policy also appears to have induced some international students, who may have otherwise chosen a different field, to major in STEM.

## References

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The Complexity of Immigrant Generations: Implications for Assessing the Socioeconomic Integration of Hispanics and Asians



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[OPT Policy Changes and Foreign Born STEM Talent in the U.S.](#)

OPT Policy Changes and Foreign Born STEM Talent in the U.S.

# Do Human Capital Decisions Respond to the Returns to Education? Evidence from DACA

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Southern Methodist University,  
IZA, and NBER

Na'ama Shenhav†

Dartmouth College

Kevin Shih‡

Queens College  
City University of New York

January 29, 2019<sup>§</sup>

## Abstract

This paper studies human capital responses to the availability of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which provides temporary work authorization and deferral from deportation for undocumented, high-school-educated youth. Using a difference-in-differences design that compares (near-) eligible to non-eligible individuals over time, we find that DACA significantly increased high school attendance and high school graduation rates, reducing the eligible-non-eligible gap in graduation by 40%. We also find positive, though imprecise, impacts on college attendance. Our effects imply an elasticity of high school completion and college attendance to lifetime earnings between 0.05 and 0.17.

generation individuals from all countries of origin (including countries not listed individually in the table). Separate calculations are presented for men and women.

For the first generation, these tables illustrate the well-known diversity of educational attainment among U.S. immigrants (Betts and Lofstrom 2000; Card 2005). Average schooling levels range from about 10 years for those born in Mexico and Central America to 15 years and above for those born in India, Japan, Korea, and Canada. For comparison purposes, note that average years of schooling among third+-generation non-Hispanic whites is 13.8 years for men and 14 years for women.

**Table 3.1 Average Education of First- and  
Second-Generation Adults, Aged 25–59, by  
Source Country and Sex**

Table 3.1 Average Education of First and Second Generation Immigrants, age 15-60 by country of birth and gender

Source country	Men, by immigrant generation				Women, by immigrant generation			
	First		Second		First		Second	
	Avg. educ.	Sample size	Avg. educ.	Sample size	Avg. educ.	Sample size	Avg. educ.	Sample size
Mexico	9.5	31,039	12.7	7,671	9.7	28,167	12.9	8,468
Puerto Rico	12.2	2,909	12.7	2,459	12.4	3,643	13.0	2,996
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Europe	14.5	10,147	14.5	12,895	14.5	11,594	14.6	13,351
All countries	12.2	99,966	13.9	38,459	12.4	106,372	14.1	40,812

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NOTE: The education measure is completed years of schooling. The samples include people aged 25–59. The “first generation” consists of foreign-born individuals, excluding those born abroad of an American parent. The “second generation” consists of U.S.-born individuals who have at least one foreign-born parent. The bottom row

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Source: Pozo, Susan (2018) The Human and Economic Implications of 21st Century Immigration Policy . W.E. Upjohn Institute. Kindle Edition.

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2 The Economic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration: Implications for Policy Pia M. Orrenius and Stephanie Gullo

3 Socioeconomic Integration of U.S. Immigrant Groups over the Long Term: The Second Generation and Beyond Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo

4 Immigrants and Poverty: How Do They Cope with It, How Do They Affect Natives? Giovanni Peri

5 Understanding the Consequences of Heightened Interior Immigration Enforcement Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and Esther Arenas-Arroyo

6 Understanding Migration Policy: Insights from Models of International Trade Alfonso Cebreros, Daniel Chiquiar, Monica Roa, and Martín Tobal

7 *Combining Physical and Financial Solidarity in Asylum Policy Jesús* Fernández-Huertas Moraga and Hillel Rapoport Authors

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## **Remittances and Development: Alfredo Cuecuecha GTM immigrants, immigrants from Ghana**

What migration theory give rise to remittances?

Why does it help residents of equator countries to have relatives in cities or OECD capitals (Paris, London New York)

Why does the IDB -WB-CGD appreciate about remittances and TSP as Humanitarian relief?

Why is the Trump administration trying to end TSP (2 reasons)? (hint: what does TSP stand for?)

Remittances as an alternative to 3<sup>rd</sup> Countries:

Why do Betts and Collier (2016) object to most refugee Camps run by the UNCHR?

But B&C prefer 3<sup>rd</sup> country Asylum-Refugee camps over sending refugees to NYC ?

Who funds the UNCHR? Why is this important right now (hint: GTM and Mex)

Why might 3<sup>rd</sup> country status be better for GTM than Mexico?


What is the most famous/infamous and successful/dangerous 3<sup>rd</sup> country refugee camp?

What is the difference between refugees and asylum (Cubans expect to asylum...why?)

Trump Wants to Punish Guatemala Over Failed 'Safe Third Country' Deal <https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-says-he-will-punish-guatemala-for-not-reaching-safe-third-country-agreement-11563887818?shareToken=st8ccd203ac75642f4bfa9c53b90b0dd1e> <http://www.gdsnet.org/>



**Fig PG-2C LatAm Peers Ecuador Peru Costa Rica & Dom Rep**  
 (Country GDP per capita as a % of U.S. in comparable \$US 2011PPP)




Source IMF WEO Oct 2018 data base, \$2011 PPP GDP per capita,  
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/index.aspx>

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## Voter turnout rate increased sharply across racial and ethnic groups during 2018 midterm elections

*% of eligible voters who say they voted, by midterm election year*



Note: Eligible voters are U.S. citizens ages 18 and older. Whites, blacks and Asians include only non-Hispanics. Hispanics are of any race.

Source: Pew Research Center analysis of the Current Population Survey, November Supplements, 1990-2018.

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