# Exchange rate Policy in Latin America: overcoming fear of floating

ECON 3235 Economics of LatAm Lecture 3C notes Fall 2017 Darryl McLeod, Fordham University

# Real exchange rate flexibility a serious problem in LatAm (and the Euro zone...)

- At the end of Chapter 6 Edwards, 2010 argues, "In the story" of Latin American economic reform, then, one variable more than any other plays a crucial role. It is not inflation, wages, or economic growth; it is not privatization or the extent of openness and globalization; it is not even foreign debt. The key variable is the exchange rate, or the value of the local currency-the peso, the bolivar, the quetzal, the real, or the cordoba-in relation to the United States dollar. Repeated mistakes in exchange-rate policy will be singled out as the most important cause behind the region's economic travails, the waning support for modernizing reforms, and the eventual revival of populism during the twenty-first century. Sebastian Edwards. Left Behind: Latin America and the False Promise of Populism Kindle Edition (chapter 6).
- **Some good news**: with a few exceptions, exchange rate management has improved greatly and region has learned to cope with commodity price instability and "sudden stops" in private capital flows.

## Key exchange rate management challenges for Emerging Market countries

- 1. Dutch Disease (DD) natural resource booms and busts: Populist spending and public and private capital inflows amplify the boom bust-cycle....
- 2. Devaluing nominal exchange rate counters DD: but can be inflationary... almost all LatAm countries used "nominal anchors" to stop inflation in 1990s (ABC &M).
- 3. Capital inflows and Financial liberalization can aggravate DD: CA deficit, followed by capital inflows, real estate boom, more credit expansion, more imports, they collapse of banks and external debt crisis (and inflation) follow... This is the "proto-typical" Rheinhart and Rogoff financial crises, see Chile in 1982 and Mexico in 1995 newly privatized banks aggravate crisis

## **Policy responses to external shocks**

- *Four ways to reverse a CA deficit:* (two shift, two move along S&D):
  - **1. External devaluation:** changes in the nominal exchange rate
  - **2. Internal devaluation:** changes in domestic prices-deflation
  - **3. Stabilization policy:** demand side, cut fiscal spending and deficit/ tight money policy (raise interest rates)
  - **4. Structural Adjustment:** supply side, make exports more competitive

# Good neighbor policy responses to external shocks

### Contagion and beggar thy neighbor policies:


- Internal devaluation low contagion (populist backlash?)
- External devaluation: can be contagious, beggar thy neighbor
- Using stabilization policy reduces contagion (why?)
- Labor mobility helps mitigate crises (Haiti, SLV TPS) creates remittances
- Fiscal transfers: aid, debt relief, debt guarantees emergency funds (FEMA now in Puerto Rico...)

# Four external adjustment options in the market for dollars diagram

#### Four Adjustment Options again:


**1. External Devaluation:** raise e to raise q, moving along S & D curve to point A....

2. Internal Devaluation: raise q by reducing <sup>q=</sup> domestic prices/wages, p, until q reaches point A (5 as in #1 but with e fixed....)
3. Stabilization Policy: shift Demand Curve D to left, reducing CA deficit to zero at B with RER & exchange rate unchanged.
4. Structural Adjustment labor market reform: find a way to shift S to right, lowering costs, raising productivity moving to point C, no CA deficit at same q=3...



## Pure floating (automatic adjustment) or pure fixed (the gold standard) never worked that well, see <u>DeVries</u>)

No need for government or the IMF, but for better or worse it never worked... automatically, governments cannot resist intervening, stopping automatic adjustment, with surplus countries the worst offenders... (19<sup>th</sup> century UK and 21<sup>st</sup> century China, for example)



#### Armendariz & Larrain, 2017 Chapter 9

Sliding, and Floating

change rate regimes and monetary arrangements in contemporary Latin America

Exchange rate arrangement

Monetary policy framework	Floating	No separate legal tender, currency board, or conventional peg	Intermediate regimes/other exchange rate arrangements
Inflation-targeting	Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Paraguay Peru		Guatemala
Monetary aggregate target	Uruguay		
Exchange rate anchor (US dollar)		Ecuador El Salvador Panama Venezuela	Honduras Nicaragua
Other			Argentina Bolivia Costa Rica

thors' own construction, based on IMF 2014a.

#### Armendariz & Larrain, 2017 Chapter 9


#### Table 9.2 Exchange rate regimes in Latin America, 1985–2014

	1985	2000	2014
Countries currently	using inflation targeting		
Brazil	Intermediate	Floating	Floating
Chile	Intermediate	Floating	Floating
Colombia	Intermediate	Floating	Floating
Guatemala	Pegged	Floating	Intermediate
Mexico	Floating	Floating	Floating
Paraguay	Pegged	Floating	Floating
Peru	Intermediate	Floating	Floating
Countries currently	without inflation targeting		
Argentina	Floating	Pegged	Intermediate
Bolivia	Pegged	Intermediate	Intermediate
Costa Rica	Floating	Intermediate	Intermediate
Ecuador	Floating	Pegged	Pegged
El Salvador	Floating	Pegged	Pegged
Honduras	Pegged	Intermediate	Intermediate
Nicaragua	Pegged	Intermediate	Intermediate
Panama	Pegged	Pegged	Pegged
Uruguay	Floating	Intermediate	Floating
Venezuela	Pegged	Intermediate	Pegged


Source: IMF 2008.

In Latin America, the tail often wags the dog: dollar inflows often determine the CA balance and RER, mainly private capital flows... some FDI, China increasingly important after 2000

Figure 2: capital flows and the RER in a small open economy




Suppose international markets determine, dollar inflows must end which means CA balance must shrink to zero (or become a surplus to pay down debt). What can a country do? 4 policy options



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# **Does Internal Devaluation work?**


Figure 1B Policy option #2: reduce Real Exchange p to raise q (internal devaluation)



Internal devaluation is much harder, leave e fixed but reduce p (domestic prices and wages) so that q falls., harder and slower and usually starts with sharp recession, see next slide

# Does Internal Devaluation work? not in Argentina during 1990s

Figure U-3 Argentina Unemployment Rate



# Does Internal Devaluation work? Latvia is EU-IMF success story


#### **Box 4. Latvia: Internal Devaluation**

Internal devaluation policies aimed at improving competitiveness through wage cuts in the government

and state-owned enterprises, promotion of wage restraint in the private sector, (e.g., via actions by a new Committee to Promote Wage Restraint created within the National Tripartite Cooperation Council), and structural measures to improve the ease of doing business and productivity.

These policies along with significant economic slack helped factor prices decline relative to trading partners. The real effective exchange rate depreciated as wages and prices declined. Notably, the ULC-based real effective exchange


rate depreciated by about 24 percent from the peak in mid 2008 to end-2011. The CPI- and PPI-based REER depreciated by about 7 and 10 percent respectively from their peaks till end 2011 According to



Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates

# Does Internal Devaluation work? Latvia again very high unemployment

From the peak at the height of the crisis in end-2008 to trough at early 2010, public wages fell by 27 percent while private wages fell by 6 percent and started growing again in mid 2010 (although anecdotal evidence suggests that the true private wage decline is larger). Much of the adjustment to the drop in demand was achieved through layoffs rather than wage reduction. Unemployment rose even as emigration increased (about 4 percent of the population emigrated during 2008-2010). Job losses were concentrated in the non-tradable sector, notably construction, where roughly a third of all job losses took place.



The unemployment rate is now declining rapidly despite increasing participation in the labor market, underpinned by strong job creation. Nonetheless the level of unemployment – mainly structural unemployment – remains high, suggesting mismatches in the labor market that will likely take time to unwind.

## Still Puerto Rico, Ecuador, Panama & El Salvador have hard pegs and the Bolíviano largely pegged to the dollar: why?

**JSD to BOB Chart** 

20 Oct 2007 00:00 UTC - 16 Oct 2017 16:38 UTC USD/BOB close:6.90858 low:6.73000 high:7.70920



## Options for fixed exchange rate countries and territories:

- Keep domestic prices increases low to avoid overvaluation
- Manage capital inflows carefully, FDI only?
- Find a lender/patron (Ecuador has China)
- Fiscal transfers
- Structural Adjustment (supply side policies):
- Reduce prices and wages? This is what the WSJ suggests for Puerto Rico (next slide)

## **Options for fixed exchange rate territories:** WSJ & the Krueger report say U.S. min wage is too high for Puerto Rico


#### An Island Apart

Compared to the U.S. economy, Puerto Rico has struggled to attract jobs and has much lower rates of labor-force participation, which economists say is partly due to a high minimum wage that depresses labor demand and generous benefit payments that reduce supply.


United States average Puerto Rico

#### Percentage change in nonfarm employment since 1990

monthly, seasonally adjusted



Labor force participation rate annually, seasonally adjusted



\*Minimum wage uses federal minimum wage (\$7.25/hour) or state minimum wage, whichever is higher Sources: Labor Department (employment, minimum wage); World Bank (labor participation)

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

2013

63%

2013

43%


1.1.1.

### Lack of jobs leads to outmigration (despite well established Pharma industry) see also El Salvador and East Germany in 1990s... WSJ, 2015, Puerto Rico's

Pain Is Tied to U.S. Wages: Economists say island's use of the mainland's minimum pay helps crimp its economy <u>http://on.wsj.com/1Cb3BBY</u> Movers pack up Yessenia Puente's San Juan apartment Wednesday as she prepares to move to Orlando, Fla., this weekend. People are fleeing the island amid a financial crisis that has resulted in an estimated \$72 billion public debt for the Puerto Rican government. PHOTO:JOE RAEDLE/GETTY IMAGES




Suppose international markets determine, dollar inflows must end which means CA balance must shrink or become surpluses to pay down debt). What can a country do? three policy options



Stabilization or "good" vs. beggar thy neighbor Policy use fiscal and monetary policy to put Shift import demand to the left and put downward pressure on wages and prices (internal devaluation). Impact is same for q, but internal devaluation less likely to trigger retaliatory devaluation (contagion) this is why IMF wants some internal adjustment, almost always, especially reductions in G.

Suppose international markets determine, dollar inflows must end which means CA balance must shrink to zero (or become a surplus to pay down debt). What can a country do? 4 policy options



Structural adjustment passes productivity on to trading partners.. use trade and labor market policies or public infrastructure investment to reduce costs and increase TFP..... Hard to do, takes time, but silver lining of rebalancing or crisis response: structural reforms reduce costs for consumers at home and abroad, increase demand for exports at all levels of q....

# Real exchange rate = $ep^*/p_d$


- Inflation adjusted price of dollars or real exchange rate
- Internal devaluation: p falls (deflation)
- External devaluation: e rises, but inflation may too, and often causality runs from
- Can also be interpreted as the price of traded over nontraded goods  $P_T/P_N$

# Four external adjustment options in the market for dollars diagram

#### Four Adjustment Options again:


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
#### Chile exchange rate weakens during crisis years, and remains much weaker that it was in 1970





El Salvador's RER strengthened since the war years, and continued to do so even after it adopted the U.S. dollar as it's currency in 2001, how and why? (recall the formula for the RER)

> Figure RER-2 El Salvador inflation adjusted "Real" Exchange Rate (real price of a dollar in El Salvador)




A rise is a depreciation of the local currency, a fall is an appreciation of the local curreny (dollars are cheaper)

# 1970 1974 1976 1976 1976 1976 1976 1978 1978 1980 1980 1980 1980 1986 1986 1986 1988 1998 <t

Source: Shane, M (2012) USDA Historical Exchange Rates (2005 base).


#### USDA computes real exchange rates for all Countries: why?



Source: Shane, M (2012) USDA Historical Exchange Rates (2005 base).

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
#### Figure RER-5: Dominican Republic inflation adjusted "real" Exchange Rate



A rise is a depreciation of the local currency, a fall is an appreciation of the local curreny (dollars are cheaper)



The USDA estimates real exchange rates for all Countries: why?




A rise is a depreciation of the local currency, a fall is an appreciation of the local curreny (dollars are cheaper)

## 

Source: Shane, M (2012) USDA Historical Exchange Rates (2005 base).

#### Argentina experienced two sharp depreciations of its currency




Lecture Notes ECON 3235

# **Amplified boom-bust cycle**


#### Table 3. Amplifiers of Boom-Bust Cycles: The Usual Suspects

Procyclical macroeconomic policies Hidden debts (implicit guarantees) Overvalued currencies Poor regulation Even worse supervision Outright fraud Myopic credit rating agencies


#### Chile real exchange rate and per-capita GDP growth (growth is shown as 3-year moving average)



# Commodity prices over the last decade have been even more volatile than usual.




## **Correlations Gov Spending & growth 1960-1999**




- Procyclicality has been especially strong in commodity-exporting countries.
- An important development -some developing countries, including commodity producers, were able to break the historic pattern in the most recent decade:
  - taking advantage of the boom of 2002-2008
    - to run budget surpluses & build reserves,
  - thereby earning the ability to expand fiscally in the 2008-09 crisis.
  - Chile is the outstanding model;
    - also Botswana, China, Indonesia, & Korea.



### Correlations between Government & GDP Reversed in many ctys "Graduation"




Box figure 3.1 The relation between different deficit concepts



Primary deficit excludes interest payments, a reduction in inflation reduces deficit, still need primary surplus to stablize

#### The Dutch Disease is one component of the NRC Natural Resource Curse: The size of the primary sector is not correlated positively with GDP growth

1970-2009



## Appendix I: The Natural Resource Curse

Seven possible channels that some have suggested could lead to sub-standard economic performance:

- \* Long-term trends in world commodity prices (Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, 1950. But negative trend has not been borne out.)
- \* Volatility (e.g., Hausmann & Rigobon, 2003)
- \* Permanent crowding out of manufacturing (Matsuyama, 1992)
- \* Unsustainability
- \* Civil war (Collier, 2007...)
- \* Poor institutions (Auty, Sachs-Warner, Engerman-Sokoloff...), and
- \* Cyclical Dutch Disease.

JF, "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," 2011